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Introduction
Histories of the tumultuous early years of the US patent system
have focused on “courts and parties.”1 Congress, using its constitutional
authority to “promote the [p]rogress of . . . useful [a]rts,” passed three
patent acts in rapid succession.2 To understand the transition from the
practices of colonial North America to the world’s first modern patent
system, intellectual histories focusing on legislation and judicial
opinions, as well as their interpretation by contemporary politicians and
legal thinkers, have been invaluable.3 There was a third site of
†

Professor of Law and Affiliate Professor of History, Northeastern University,
Boston, MA. B.S., Yale University; M.A./J.D., University of CaliforniaBerkeley; Ph.D., Harvard University. k.swanson@northeastern.edu. Many
thanks to the organizers and participants in The Rise of Intellectual Property
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Classical Liberal Institute,
NYU School of Law, held virtually, summer 2020, for comments and
suggestions, and to Jed Shugerman, Sanford Levinson and participants in
the Law & Humanities Junior Scholar Workshop, Georgetown University
School of Law, 2013, for comments on an earlier version.

1.

Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The
Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920, at 24
(1982) (describing early republic as a “state of courts and parties”).

2.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The three statutory schemes were those created
by the Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); the Patent
Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); and the Patent Act of
1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).

3.

See, e.g., Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins
of American Intellectual Property, 1790–1909, at 12–31, 47–53,
188–306 (2016) [hereinafter Bracha, Owning Ideas]; Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts:
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contestation, however. The patent clerk in his daily actions, imple–
menting changing legislative mandates, was also influencing how
Americans understood patents.4 As Woodrow Wilson noted over one
hundred years ago, scholars and political theorists have long put aside
“as ‘practical detail’ which clerks could arrange” the question of “how
law should be administered with enlightenment, with equity, with
speed, and without friction.”5 This Essay focuses on patent bureaucrats
American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836 (1998); Oren
Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents
Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 177
(2004) [hereinafter Bracha, Commodification]; Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 263
(2016); Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire,
28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 45 (2013); B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights
and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. Econ.
Hist. 58 (1995); Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent
Law, 32 Tech. & Culture 932 (1991); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent
“Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 953 (2007); Adam
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical
Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689,
(2007); Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American
Patent Law, 5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 254 (1961); Frank D. Prager, Historic
Background and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 309 (1961); Frank D. Prager, Trends and Developments in
American Patent Law from Jefferson to Clifford (1790–1870), Part II, 6
Am. J. Legal Hist. 45 (1962).
4.

I use “his” deliberately, as the actors I discuss during this time period
were all male, although William Thornton, patent clerk in the early
nineteenth century, drafted his wife, Anna Maria, to help him with patent
copying duties and women also worked as copyists in the Patent Office in
the 1850s. Daniel Preston, The Administration and Reform of the U.S.
Patent Office, 1790–1836, 5 J. Early Republic 331, 336 (1985) (noting
Mrs. Thornton’s participation); Kara W. Swanson, Rubbing Elbows and
Blowing Smoke: Gender, Class, and Science in the Nineteenth-Century
Patent Office, 108 Isis 40, 45–46, 48, 51 (2017). The participants were
also all white. Kenneth W. Dobyns, The Patent Office Pony: A
History of the Early Patent Office 234 (2d ed. 2016) (identifying
the first possible Black clerical employee of patent office in 1870). Note
that while concentrating on the intellectual history of the patent system,
Bracha also agrees the patent system involves more than law and policy
decisions. Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, at 182; see also Robert
Burrell & Catherine Kelly, Parliamentary Rewards and the Evolution of
the Patent System, 74 Cambridge L.J. 423, 449 (2015) (noting the
significance of bureaucrats (“law officers”) in the development of UK
patent law before 1830). For a similar emphasis on administration, see
Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution:
The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law
6 and passim (2012).

5.

Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 Pol. Sci. Q. 197, 198–
99 (1887); see also Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira
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and the practical details they arranged.6 In processing patent applica–
tions, they were required to interpret the law. Their decisions frequently
raised questions of “equity,” leading to considerable “friction.”7 In their
paper-shuffling, patent bureaucrats materialized political theory.8 Daily
procedure translated high-order questions about the nature and purpose
of patents into mundane controversies about application processing and
civil service hiring.
The relationship between patent applicants and the government,
and thus the nature of patents themselves as the product of that
relationship, was enacted in the making of patents, practical detail by
practical detail. In the first decades of the US patent system, there was
a widely acknowledged shift from patents as privileges to patents as
rights, as the relationship between the inventor and the state changed
in law and political theory.9 What began in early modern Europe and
Chamber of Commerce, May 3, 1907, in Addresses of Charles Evans
Hughes, 1906–1916, at 186 (2d ed. 1916) (distinguishing administrative
“matters of detail” from “real” judicial questions) (as quoted by Daniel
R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State
Emerges in America, 1900–1940, at 29 (2014)).
6.

For the historiography of the patent clerk and the Patent Office, see generally
Robert C. Post, Physics, Patents and Politics: A Biography of
Charles Grafton Page 42–61, 108–64 (1976) [hereinafter Post,
Physics, Patents and Politics] (discussing the experiences of Charles
Page, as patent examiner and patent agent in the broader context of the midnineteenth-century patent office); Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers” Versus
“Scientific Men” in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 Tech. & Culture
(1976) [hereinafter Post, “Liberalizers”] (discussing the competing philo–
sophies of “liberalizers” and “scientific men” in the mid-century Patent
Office); Dobyns, supra note 4 (providing a history of the first century of the
Patent Office); P.J. FEDERICO, ed., OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES PATENT OFFICE (1936)(reprint of July 1936 number of the J. Pat.
Off. Soc’y); Preston, supra note 4 (discussing patent administration from
1790–1836).

7.

See Wilson, supra note 5, at 198–99.

8.

Cf. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in
the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 775–76 (1994)
(arguing that executive officers interpret the Constitution through daily
actions); Mashaw, supra note 4, at 16 (focusing on administrative action
rather than legislative or judicial actions).

9.

See, e.g., Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, at 180–81, passim
(explaining transition from privilege to right). See also Bracha, Owning
Ideas, supra note 3, at 5, 11; Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical
Context, supra note 3, at 967–68 (focusing on the US patent system and
interpreting it in context of British precedents). Cf. Sean Bottomley,
The British Patent System During the Industrial Revolution
1700–1852: From Privilege to Property, at 20–23, passim (2014)
(interpreting British patent history in this period as transition from
patents as privileges to property); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American
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colonial America as a discretionary privilege granted by a sovereign
became an application as of right in the United States.10 How patent
administrators performed their role crucially contributed to what
patents were. The changing patent laws mandated different levels of
administrative discretion. In arranging the practical details of patent
processing, bureaucrats both narrowed and enlarged the scope of their
statutory discretion, thereby making patents more or less like privileges
or rights. Further, as they exercised discretion, administrators enacted
their understanding of the purpose of patents, choosing to emphasize
the public benefit which might flow from this means of encouraging new
technologies, or the private concerns of inventors, seeking maximum
economic return. With recognition of their power to shape the nature
and purpose of patents came controversy about the best men for the
job. Was making patents a job for copyists or cabinet officials?
Considering these questions brings us to a clerk’s eye view of the
patent system, a level at which personal inclinations and practical
considerations mattered more than declarations of Congress and courts,
which often became certain only in retrospect.11 In the muddy reality
of daily work, patent processing refused to fit neatly into an orderly
narrative of transformation from privilege to right, guided by the
constitutionally mandated purpose to “promote the [p]rogress of . . .
useful [a]rts.”12 Grand claims of social benefit and individual rights
dissipated in countless bureaucratic decisions.13 Reliance on ex ante
bureaucratic review and ex post critique in courts and the marketplace
seesawed back and forth depending on the legislative regime and the
actions of the administrators. Bureaucrats, wanting to get the job done,
Administrative Law: Federalism Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J.
1256, 1263 (describing how “administration projects state power”).
10.

Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing
Rights and Authors, 73 Soc. Rsch. 1129, 1129 (2006); Bracha, Owning
Ideas, supra note 3, at 6, 188–89; Bottomley, supra note 9, at 103; see
also B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention: Patents
and Copyrights in American Economic Development, 1790–1920,
at 2 (2005) (arguing the US patent law was suffused from the outset with
anti-privilege ideas).

11.

See, e.g., Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 227–30 (demonstrating
that Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850) now seen as a turning
point in the development of nonobviousness doctrine, did not become so
until later); Kara W. Swanson, Race, Gender, and the True Inventor (work
in progress presented virtually at Working with Intellectual Property: Legal
Histories of Innovation, Labor, and Creativity, Stanford Center for Law and
History, Stanford Law School, spring 2021) (arguing that meaning of “true
inventor” as enacted into patent laws in 1790, 1793 and 1836 did not become
certain until the end of the nineteenth century).

12.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

13.

Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 304–06.
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responded to the immediate pressures of applicants, colleagues, and
superiors.14
In the twenty-first century, the nature and purpose of patents
remains consequentially contested, in high stakes debates tied to the
interpretation of their early history.15 This Essay argues that in order
for twenty-first-century scholars to evaluate these debates and fully
understand the antebellum patent system, we need to understand how
antebellum patent bureaucrats made patents. Our histories of the
patent system need to include the clerk.
While not offering a full history of seventy years of patent
administration, this Essay analyzes US patent making under the three
legislative regimes of the antebellum period. I first question dominant
assumptions about the early patent board (1790–93) as highly discre–
tionary and public-oriented, and then review the considerable power
William Thornton wielded between 1802 and 1828 to shape the patent
system in service of inventors, despite the formal absence of any
discretion to do so, before turning to the first decades of the modern
examination system (1836–60), when debates raged about who should
fill the new patent examiner positions. In each era, I consider who was
processing patent applications and how, arguing that such details
shaped public perceptions about the nature and purpose of patents. In
14.

Contemporary studies have demonstrated such pressures and analyzed
them as a form of regulatory capture. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Josh
Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent
System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to
Do About It 136 (2004) (discussing examiners under pressure to “‘go easy’
on applicants and allow their patents to be granted”); Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can
Solve It 22–24 (2009) (arguing that PTO suffers from capture by patent
applicants); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics
and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 817, 817, 826 (2012)
(identifying different groups of examiners with different responses to agency
and applicant pressures); Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An Empirical
Study of Examiner Allowance Rates, 2012 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 10, at 2
(2012) (same). For a recent review of contemporary empirical literature of
patent examiner behavior, see Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman,
Empirical Scholarship on the Prosecution Process at the USPTO, in
Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property
Law 77 (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., 2019).

15.

Compare Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138
S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (finding that patents are public rights and therefore
that administrative post-grant review of patents does not violate Article
III), with Adam Mossoff, Statutes, Common Law Rights, and the Mistaken
Classification of Patents as Public Rights, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 2591, 2593–
94 (2019) (arguing that Oil States was incorrectly decided based on a
misunderstanding of history), and N. Scott Pierce, Double Jeopardy:
Patents of Invention as Contracts, Invention Disclosure as Consideration,
and Where Oil States Went Wrong, 30 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media
& Ent. L.J. 645, 649–51 (2020) (same).
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conclusion, I draw some suggestions from this initial survey of US
patent administration both for our historical understanding of patents
and contemporary critiques of the Patent Office, reminding us of the
power of clerks.

I. Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Board, 1790–93
The Patent Office has long proudly claimed Thomas Jefferson as
the first patent bureaucrat.16 As Secretary of State in President George
Washington’s first administration, Jefferson acted, along with Secretary
of War Henry Knox and Attorney General Edmund Randolph, as part
of a three-person “patent board,” pursuant to the Patent Act of 1790.17
To obtain exclusive rights for up to fourteen years to make, use, and
sell an inventive idea “not before known or used,” “any person” could
submit a petition to these three men.18 If at least two of them found
the invention “sufficiently useful and important,” the board was to
“cause letters patent to be made out.”19 If a patent was obtained
“surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion,” a district court judge had
the power to repeal it, but the Act made no provision for appeal from
a refusal to grant a petition.20
This mandate to judge not only novelty but also whether an
invention was “sufficiently useful and important,” combined with the
lack of recourse if a petition were denied, created a process similar to
that by which petitioners had sought patents from the British crown
and from colonial governments.21 As in these systems, no petitioner,
16.

As part of the Centennial Celebration of the patent system, the Patent
Office Society, the organization of patent clerks, dedicated a bust of Thomas
Jefferson, claiming him as the first “Commissioner of Patents.” E. F. Klinge,
Address at the Dedication Ceremony of the Bust of Thomas Jefferson (Nov.
23, 1936), in Nat’l Comm. on Centennial Celebration of the Am.
Pat. Sys., Centennial Celebration of the American Patent
System 28–29 (1937).

17.

P. J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y
237, 237–38 (1936).

18.

Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–110 (1790).

19.

Id.

20.

Id. § 5; see Christopher Beauchamp, Repealing Patents, 72 Vand. L.
Rev. 647, 663–67 (2019) (discussing repeal power).

21.

For a discussion of the origins and slow formalization of the British system,
see Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The
English Patent System, 1660–1800, at 2–3 and passim (Cambridge Univ.
Press ed., 1988); Bottomley, supra note 9, at 36-39 (noting changes
between 1535 and 1852); Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 15–25.
For previous colonial practice and state patents, see Bruce W. Bugbee,
The Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law 60–103 (1967);
Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 25–31; P. J. Federico, State
Patents, 13 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 166, 166–76 (1931); P. J. Federico, Colonial
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however inventive, had an enforceable right to a patent grant, making
it akin to a royal privilege, granted at the “grace and favour” of the
monarch.22 The small committee of unelected executive branch officers
replaced the legislature, which, in earlier colonial and state patent
processes, had considered petitions and granted patents by private bills.
While American inventors had filed patent petitions with Congress
seeking to continue this earlier approach, Congress refused to exercise
its delegated power by granting patents directly.23
Instead, by designating the Secretaries of State and War as patent
administrators, Congress had assigned the heads of two of only three
executive departments to the task of processing patent petitions.24 Due
to their government positions, between them, Jefferson and Knox had
a comprehensive understanding of domestic and foreign affairs. The
third board member, Attorney General Randolph, was the govern–
ment’s legal advisor and also had the duty of examining each patent,
once “made out,” for conformity to the statute.25 Like the monarch,
these men sat at the center of power as they made their judgment about
what was “sufficiently useful and important,” with the ability to
consider all national priorities.26 They also were not directly responsible
to the people or their representatives, as they were appointed by the
president. These elite men, what President Washington called “first
characters of the Union,” read each application and made unreviewable
decisions.27
Monopolies and Patents, 11 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 358, 358–64 (1929); Hrdy,
supra note 3, at 58–60.
22.

Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 22 (citing W. M. Hindmarch,
A Treatise on the Law Relative to Patent Privileges for the
Sole Use of Inventions 3–4 (1846)). While explaining these similarities
in greater detail, Bracha also notes that US patents of this period differed
from prior colonial and British patents in that they were “universalized
privilege[s],” as the statutory guidance offered a new standardization of
the entitlements to be granted. Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3,
at 219, 222.

23.

Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 37, 81–87, 107–08, 115–20.

24.

The third department was Treasury. Leonard D. White, The Feder–
alists: A Study in Administrative History 26 (1948). Cf. Mashaw,
supra note 9, at 1286–87 (arguing that Treasury was not an executive
department).

25.

Patent Act of 1790 § 1; Mashaw, supra note 9, at 1289–90 (describing role
of Attorney General).

26.

Patent Act of 1790 § 1.

27.

“From George Washington to James Madison, 23 September 1789,”
Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/05-04-02-0046 [Original source: The Papers of
George Washington, Presidential Series, vol. 4, 8 September 1789 – 15
January 1790, ed. Dorothy Twohig. Charlottesville: University Press of
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From their privileged position, these men made patent grants based
on their understanding of the public good.28 Surviving records indicate
that Jefferson, himself an inventor, took the lead in patent
administration duties.29 As Jefferson described his work decades later,
he examined patent applications “[c]onsidering the exclusive right to
invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society.”30
Petition by petition, board members, led by Jefferson, learned about
new technologies that might be useful to the new nation and then were
directed to select only those sufficiently important and useful for a
patent grant.31
It is this combination of factors, that is, lack of review from denial
and examination by elite men charged with promoting social benefit on
a national scale, that has led both scholars and participants to

Virginia, 1993, pp. 67–68] (describing type of men sought for judicial
appointments); see also Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A
Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829, at 258–63, 267–69, 508
(1951) (describing general approach to appointments by Presidents
Washington and Adams).
28.

See Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, at 181 (arguing that patents
of this era fulfilled “individually defined public purposes”).

29.

Memorandum Book of the Office of the Secretary of Congress, 1785–88, and
of the Department of State, 1789–1795, microformed on Papers of the
Continental Congress, 1774–1779, Microscopy No. 247, Roll 198, Item 187
(National Archives Microfilm Publications), at 49–76 (recording that only
Jefferson and Knox attended periodic meetings between April 17, 1790 and
July 9, 1790); Keith Thomson, Jefferson’s Shadow: The Story of
His Science 165-75 (2012) (Jefferson’s inventions); see also
Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 179-83; Federico, supra note 17, at 238.

30.

“From Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813,” Founders
Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/03-06-02-0322 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 6, 11 March to 27 November 1813, ed.
J. Jefferson Looney. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 379–
386] (recollecting twenty years later); see also Mossoff, Who Cares What
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent
“Privilege” in Historical Context, supra note 3, at 955 (arguing that
Jefferson’s reminiscences are frequently misread and overemphasized);
Christopher Beauchamp, Oliver Evans and the Framing of American
Patent Law, 71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1, 468–71 (2020) (setting
Jefferson’s letter in context of Oliver Evan’s patent litigation).

31.

For Jefferson’s lifelong engagement with technology and its links to his
political philosophy, see, for example, Hugo A. Meier, Thomas Jefferson
and a Democratic Technology, in Technology in America: A History
of Individuals and Ideas 17–33 (Carroll W. Pursell, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1990).
How elite Americans thought about the role of manufactures, and thus
labor-saving technology, varied. Jefferson’s views sharply diverged from
those of Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of Treasury. Walterscheid,
supra note 3, at 147–48, 155.
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characterize early US patents as privileges.32 The ability to monetize an
inventive idea through a federal grant that could be licensed and
assigned was not a right granted to inventors by Congress, but rather
a privilege that might be bestowed or withheld in the unreviewable
discretion of bureaucrats. This privilege model was replaced during the
nineteenth century by the current system in which inventors seek
patents with an expectation of a grant if they meet the legal criteria of
a patentable invention and with a robust appeal process available if
their application is denied, changing patents into rights.33
While others have debated the endpoint of that shift—arguing, for
example, that the creation of a statutory right to appeal a denial, while
important, did not destroy all vestiges of a privilege-based under–
standing of the nature and purpose of patents34—I focus on the actions
of Jefferson and his fellow patent bureaucrats to understand its
beginnings, arguing that their practices of making patents during this
early period made patents less privilege-like and more rights-like than
the statutory language suggests.
The limited information available indicates that the board granted
less than half of patent petitions, a much lower rate than under later
statutory regimes.35 In their approach to making patents, these admin–
istrators apparently set a high bar when measuring patent petitions
against the purposes of the patent system, seeking to serve the interests
of a new nation as interpreted by its most influential members. Yet
there are hints that Jefferson and his colleagues, faced with the practical
problem of processing petitions, quickly began to develop practices
32.

For scholarship, see, e.g., sources cited supra notes 9–10. For participants,
see Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 196–201 (noting how patent
petitioners in this period acted as though they were seeking privileges).
Note that these two aspects of privilege—unreviewable discretion and
decision-making by elites—need not go hand-in-hand. There is also a third
aspect of patents-as-privileges: they might be most easily obtained by
those who themselves had privilege, in the sense of social capital and
economic resources. In eighteenth-century England, for example, patents
involved “an astute game of patronage.” Bottomley, supra note 9, at
43. As I suggest infra in text accompanying notes 44–46, meeting the
Board’s requests would have required resources that might have been
beyond inventors who were not themselves wealthy or who lacked wealthy
backers.

33.

See generally U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (2020) (providing detailed rules for patent
examination and intra-agency review of denials). See also Bracha, Owning
Ideas, supra note 3, at 3–4.

34.

Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 215.

35.

About fifty-seven patents were issued under the Patent Act of 1790.
Federico, supra note 17, at 244, 246 (noting that at least 114 applications
were filed in 1790 and 1791 alone); see also Dumas Malone, Jefferson
and the Rights of Man 283 (1951).
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nudging the discretionary privilege model of patents toward something
more like rights.36
Because the patent board was operational for fewer than three years
and because few records survive, hints are all that remain.37 But we
need to consider the possibility that in an uncountable number of cases,
the board denied patent petitions for reasons unrelated to its
discretionary power to evaluate the perceived importance of claimed in–
ventions. Some petitioners may have failed to describe inventions at all,
that is, technology that was new and that worked; in modern parlance,
their inventions lacked novelty and/or operability. Others may have
given up before a final board decision, unable or unwilling to respond
to board requests. In either scenario, the lack of an issued patent had
nothing to do with the discretion of the board to test inventions for
sufficiency. Early patents, thus, might have been, through bureaucratic
processing, less privilege-like than Congress intended.
Here are some hints that suggest significant numbers of petitions
might have failed for non-discretionary reasons. The board appears
rapidly to have developed a practice of asking for “a more ample
description,” a model, and/or “more complete drawings” before it made
a decision.38 In its first week of operation, the board asked petitioner
Nathan Read to share “plans and descriptions” and after reviewing
them, requested him to prepare models as well.39 By February 1791,
36.

Cf. Bracha, Commodification, supra note 3, at 222 (arguing that the
framework of the 1790 Patent Act was a “hybrid” of older privileges and
modern rights). Historians of the British patent system have traced a
similar administrator-driven change in the nature of patents during the
century and a half after British patents for invention survived the Statute
Against Monopolies (1634), as British patent practice evolved to make
patents less like privileges and more like rights as clerks attended to the
practical details. Bottomley, supra note 9, at 48–49, 63 (noting the
decreased emphasis in considering how an invention contributed to the
public good over the eighteenth century and that high fees and the
convoluted process served to “weed out” about 20% of patents); Bracha,
Commodification, supra note 3, at 201–02 (describing British shift via law
in action); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An
Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1294 (2001)
(arguing that English patents had become rights by the late eighteenth
century).

37.

Federico, supra note 17, at 244–45 (noting surviving records).

38.

“From Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, 4 February 1791,”
Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-0019 [Original source: The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 19, 24 January–31 March 1791, ed. Julian P. Boyd.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 240–241] (as cited in
Federico, supra note 17, at 243).

39.

Notation made April 17, 1790, Memorandum Book of Department of
State, 1789–95, supra note 29, at 49.
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Jefferson referred to this practice as a “general rule.”40 Further, records
indicate that the board held hearings, asking petitioners to appear in
person and explain their inventions.41 All of these actions were extrastatutory. The statute stated that patentees did not have to provide an
enabling specification (that is, a detailed description) or model until the
patent had already been granted and made no mention of hearings.42
Following the statutory guidance, early petitioners appear to have
provided very little detail about their inventions in their initial
petitions.43
Responding to the board demands would have increased the upfront
expense to petitioners, possibly significantly. Filing a petition cost fifty
cents. Once a patent was approved, the applicant had to pay for filing
a specification and having a patent “made out,” sealed, and endorsed,
fees totaling $3.20 plus a per word charge, resulting in a final cost of
$4–5.44 A stagecoach ride from New York to Philadelphia to appear
before the board could cost $5 and take two days and then there might
be the need to pay for food and lodging.45 Jacob Isaacks, of Newport,
Rhode Island, who travelled to Philadelphia in early 1791 to
demonstrate his invention, complained to Jefferson that “his delay here
is very distressing” on account of his poverty.46 If petitioners had not
already prepared drawings or a model, they would have faced prepar–
40.

“From Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston,” supra note 38.

41.

Memorandum Book of Department of State, 1789-1795, supra note 29, at
49, 61, 63, 65, 68, 70–72, 75–76 (notes of meetings held April, June and
July, 1790); see also Federico, supra note 17, at 242; Walterscheid, supra
note 3, at 178–81.

42.

Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110–111 (1790).

43.

Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 162, 164 (noting that Oliver Evans’
petition was unusual in its specificity); Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra
note 3, at 192 (discussing the emphasis on social contribution in petitions
rather than enabling details).

44.

Patent Act of 1790 §§ 1, 7; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 31, 35.

45.

The Swift-Sure, A New Line of Stages, Gazette U.S. & Phila. Daily
Advertiser, July 15, 1799.

46.

“III. Secretary of State to Caspar Wistar, Jr., 20 March 1791,” Founders
Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/01-19-02-0171-0004 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson, vol. 19, 24 January–31 March 1791, ed. Julian P. Boyd.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 615–616]; “Editorial Note:
Experiments in Desalination of Sea Water,” Founders Online, National
Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-19-020171-0001 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 19, 24
January–31 March 1791, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1974, pp. 608–614] (describing Isaacks as “aged, infirm
and poor resident of Newport” and detailing his travels to Philadelphia via
New York).
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ation costs, which might include hiring someone to do the work. Some
petitioners might simply have been unable to pay these extra expenses.
Others might have reconsidered the worth of a patent when such
expenditures were required without any guarantee that a patent would
issue. Such recalculation seems to have been in effect among those who
had petitioned Congress directly for federal patents before passage of
the 1790 Act. Faced with the newly formalized procedure, most
evidently did not bother to resubmit petitions to the board.47 If we allow
for the possibility that a fraction of ungranted petitions were simply
dropped by inventors, the grant rate of those inventors who took the
trouble to prepare additional materials and to appear before the board
rises, coming closer to rates routinely achieved by the Patent Office
once its denials were subject to review and Congress removed the
criterion of importance from its bureaucratic mandate.48
In addition to abandoned petitions, it is both possible and
undeterminable, given the dearth of records, that another fraction of
petitions foundered when applicants failed to convince board members
that their inventions worked or were new. Another hint exists in the
form of surviving petitions, the text of which concentrated on
explaining the benefits of the invention rather than its details.49 The
board’s “general rule” of seeking additional information might have
been in aid not only of assessment of importance but also, or even
primarily, a threshold assessment of novelty and operability. There is
no reason to believe that inventors in this period were any less likely
than those in later decades to reinvent known devices unwittingly or to
claim perpetual motion machines.50 Isaacks was given the opportunity
to demonstrate his desalination process for Jefferson and an assembled
group of scientific Philadelphians, for example, but experimentation
proved that his claimed invention “does not facilitate the separation of

47.

Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 173.

48.

Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 25 (showing grant rates in early
examination years at around 66%); Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde & Alan
Marco, What Is the Probability of Receiving a U.S. Patent?, 17 Yale J.L.
& Tech. 203, 211 (2015) (showing grant rates at the turn of the twentyfirst century from 40–70%).

49.

Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 192.

50.

Two years into his tenure as Superintendent of Patents, William
Thornton told John Quincy Adams that “almost all the applications for
Patents” were not new. Entry in John Quincy Adams’s Diary (Dec. 27,
1804), The Diaries of John Quincy Adams: A Digital Collection
(Mass. Hist. Soc’y ed., 2020), http://www.masshist.org/jqadiaries/php/
popup?id=jqad27_119 [https://perma.cc/69ND-EKUY]; also included in
Papers relating to the administration of the U.S. Patent Office
Superintendency of William Thornton, 1802–1828, Harris, C.M. National
Archives Microfilm [hereinafter Thornton Papers].
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sea-water from it’s [sic] salt.”51 Jefferson, who was keenly interested in
establishing a navy, understood the importance of turning sea water
into drinking water.52 Isaacks, however, had not improved known
distillation techniques.53
These hints suggest that it is at least possible that the board was
functioning less like a monarch exercising “grace and favour,” that is,
granting privileges to serve its members’ elite view of the national
interest, and more like modern patent examiners, allowing patents if
basic requirements were met.54 Faced with the near-impossible task of
predicting the future of a technology to contribute to the nation, the
board might have retreated to some form of believable operability and
apparent novelty, tacitly agreeing that any petitioner who met those
hurdles had shown sufficient usefulness and importance and thus
sharply limiting its own discretion.55
Undoubtedly, Jefferson promoted the use of “general rules” to
minimize the time and effort of the board’s statutory duties, which he
complained “cut[] up his time into the most useless fragments.”56 Later,
he remembered the board’s efforts to reduce “their decisions to a system

51.

“VI. Affidavit of the Secretary of State on the Result of the Experiments,
26 March 1791,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-0171-0007 [Original source:
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 19, 24 January–31 March 1791, ed.
Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, pp. 617–618].

52.

“III. Secretary of State to Caspar Wistar, Jr.,” supra note 46 (stating that
it was an “advantage” of Issacks’ claim that it will increase knowledge
among “masters of vessels” about distillation of sea water). For Jefferson’s
involvement in the debates over the formation of a navy, eventually
established in 1794, see Harold Sprout & Margaret Sprout, The Rise
of American Naval Power, 1776–1918, at 17–18 (Princeton Univ. Press
5th prtg. 1967). See generally Julia H. Macleod, Jefferson and the Navy: A
Defense, 8 Huntington Libr. Q. 153 (1945) (discussing Jefferson’s views
on the establishment of a navy).

53.

Isaacks had chosen to petition Congress for “a reward suitable to the
importance of the discovery, and adequate to his expences [sic]” rather than
to seek a patent and Jefferson’s investigations thus resulted in a report to
Congress and no reward to Isaacks. “Editorial Note,” supra note 46, at n12.

54.

Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 22.

55.

See Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 665–66 (arguing that Congress envisioned
that courts would aid in winnowing out invalid patents through post-grant
repeal process included in Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793).

56.

“From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson, 1 April 1792,” Founders
Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/01-23-02-0312 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
vol. 23, 1 January–31 May 1792, ed. Charles T. Cullen. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 363].
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of rules as fast as the cases presented should furnish materials.”57 In
addition to the general rule of requiring full information about the
invention to inform the decision on patentability, Jefferson described
rules against patenting a machine based on a new use, against a “change
of material” as a patentable invention, and against patenting a “mere
change of form.”58 None of these rules had any explicit statutory basis;
they were interpretations of the statute by the bureaucrats, struggling
to implement a broad mandate.59 And each of them, over time, was
incorporated into patent law.60
Without any surviving details of board deliberations, it is not
possible to determine whether when deciding to grant a petition, the
board did so based on minimal criteria of novelty and operability, as
defined by “general rules,”—a liberal approach that would leave it to
the market to determine the usefulness and importance of such
inventions—or whether it used a two-step process, separately consid–
ering novelty and operability and additionally making a discretionary
judgment that some new and operable inventions were more important,
and thus patent-worthy, than others.61 Again, we have hints. We can
consider the patents that were granted. The first, to Samuel Hopkins,
for a method of making potash, gained support from some of the early
republic’s scientific leaders, but utterly failed in the marketplace,
despite Hopkins’ strenuous efforts to commercialize it.62 Did Jefferson
and his colleagues hope that this more expensive method to create a
57.

Id.; “Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, 25 August 1814,” Founders
Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/03-07-02-0440 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,
Retirement Series, vol. 7, 28 November 1813 to 30 September 1814, ed. J.
Jefferson Looney. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 606–
607]. Jefferson also referred to the formulation of such rules based on
experience as a slow process, which may be why Oliver Evans’ patent, the
third issued, combined several different inventions, while a later applicant
was required to divide multiple inventions into separate petitions, a require–
ment that is now also part of patent examination practice. Federico, supra
note 17, at 246–47.

58.

“From Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson,” supra note 30.

59.

The struggles of bureaucrats to interpret statutes in order to do their jobs
were widespread across the new government. See White, supra note 24,
at 10 (detailing operational details worked out in 1790s).

60.

Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 262 (1850) (change of material);
Bean v. Smallwood, 2 F. Cas. 1142, 1143 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1,173)
(new use); Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 119 (1874) (change of form).

61.

Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 274–75 (noting Adam Smith’s unen–
thusiastic views of patents in markets and Smith’s influence on Jefferson).

62.

David W. Maxey, Samuel Hopkins, the Holder of the First U.S. Patent:
A Study of Failure, 122 Pa. Mag. Hist. & Biography 3, 27, 32–33
(1998).
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useful industrial chemical would prove a social benefit, or did they
simply see no harm in letting the market decide? As Jefferson noted in
1792, the petitioners themselves “always deemed” their inventions
“valuable.”63
More telling, perhaps, is the board’s infamous decision to grant a
patent to each of four steamboat inventors, all on August 26, 1791,
without resolving who had priority or whose technology was superior.64
With no statutory provision specifying a means of identifying the true
inventor from among competing candidates (later known as interference
proceedings), the board chose not to pick a favorite.65 This solution did
not seem to advance the public good, insofar as it failed to signal to
investors which technology offered the best chance of improved
navigation.66 The market would have to sort among the contenders
without the aid of the patent system.67 Perhaps predictably, the
conflicting patents seem to have discouraged investment, with patentee
John Fitch’s investors, for example, quitting soon after he failed to gain
a clear monopoly.68 Further, the fourteen-year exclusivity granted to
the four patentees created a period of “suspended activity” and
“confusion” during which neither they nor others improved steamboat
technology.69
There is one last hint of Jefferson’s perspective on the board’s
discretion under the Patent Act of 1790. When communicating with
Hugh Williamson, a congressman involved in drafting a new patent act,
Jefferson noted that “fixed rules” for patent processing were “more
likely” “to deal out justice without partiality or favouritism,” indicating

63.

“From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson,” supra note 56.

64.

Federico, supra note 17, at 248. See generally Frank D. Prager, The Steam
Boat Interference, 1787–1793, 40 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 611 (1958) (dis–
cussing the controversy among the four inventors).

65.

Federico, supra note 17, at 248; Prager, supra note 64, at 636–37. Such a
provision was included in the Patent Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, § 9,
1 Stat. 318, 322–23 (1793).

66.

See Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 186–90.

67.

The patent board’s tolerance of unclear boundaries echoes the conflicting
rights granted by the Stationer’s Company in England in the sixteenth
and seventeenth century, a hallmark of the privilege era of copyright.
Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from
Gutenberg to Gates 25–26 (2009) (describing operation of Stationer’s
Company); Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 34–36 (analyzing
privilege aspects of early copyright). My thanks to Oren Bracha for noting
this comparison.

68.

Andrea Sutcliffe, Steam: The Untold Story of America’s First
Great Invention 119 (2004).

69.

Prager, supra note 64, at 640–41.
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some discomfort with broad discretion and the privilege-like nature of
patents it supported.70
None of these extra-statutory board practices alleviated the
inability of an unsuccessful petitioner to appeal a patent denial.
However much the bureaucrats may have constrained their statutory
discretion in the interest of efficiency, inventors lacked a forum to
demand a patent as of right.71 Nor did Jefferson in his later writings
acknowledge any contradiction between trusting market forces to weed
out impractical inventions and his espoused commitment to granting
patents only when they offered social benefit. Further, rules such as
refusing patents for new uses and changes of material or form, while
constraining discretion, also were arguably proxies for insufficiently
useful and important inventions. For these reasons, I am not arguing
that the board members and those who interacted with the board to
obtain patents developed a rights-based understanding of patents in
these three years. Rather, I am arguing that from the outset, practical
necessity translated what could have been a very high bar to obtaining
patents into a system that was less discretionary and more protective
of inventor’s rights than the statutory language and grant rate suggests.
Once we reconsider how the board processed patent petitions, we
also gain new perspective on the relevant expertise of board members,
as not only elite in power and privilege, but also in technical training.
The legislators who drafted the Patent Act of 1790 and designated the
Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General as the
patent administrators would have assumed that any holder of those
positions would be an educated gentleman in an era when education
was not confined by disciplines.72 Such a man would be a participant in

70.

“From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson,” supra note 56; Walterscheid,
supra note 3, at 195–200, 205–06 (describing Jefferson’s participation in
enacting a new law, including drafting a proposed bill).

71.

See supra text accompanying notes 55–58.

72.

The assumption of a government of educated gentleman was demonstrated
by the actions of the Constitutional Convention, the type of men serving at
that time under the Articles of Confederation, and Washington’s selections.
White, supra note 24, at 26, 30 (noting the lack of debate about executive
organization at the Constitutional Convention, the carry-over of men
already serving under the Articles of Confederation into the Washington
administration (including Knox), and Washington’s search for “men of
stature,” including Washington’s description of the desirable Secretary of
War as “not only of competent skill in the science of War, but possessing a
general knowledge of political subjects, of known attachment to the
Government we have chosen, and of proved integrity”)(quoting “From
George Washington to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 22 January 1794,”
Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/05-15-02-0084 [Original source: The Papers of
George Washington, Presidential Series, vol. 15, 1 January–30 April 1794,
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the republic of letters, in which the knowledge of law and political
philosophy shared by many politicians did not preclude equal famil–
iarity with natural philosophy and developments in machines and
manufactures.73 They might have been swayed by the fact that
Jefferson, already appointed Secretary of State when the Act was
passed, was “perhaps the public person in the United States most suited
to administer the patent law”74 because of his broad knowledge of
science and technology and familiarity with relevant literature in other
languages.75 And they might have picked the Secretary of War because
in the eighteenth century (and well into the nineteenth century),
engineering and other technical knowledge formed part of what former
General Washington referred to as “the science of War,” taught in
military schools, where students learned navigation, surveying, and
weaponry, along with the use of technical instruments that allowed
necessary calculations.76 These men might have been designated because
of their knowledge of national affairs that allowed them to assess the
social benefit of inventions, but they also might have been designated
because of their likely ability to comprehend “manufacture[s], engine[s],
machine[s], [and] device[s],” at a time when the government had no
technical library.77
As the US patent system developed, the board members,
embodying both state power at the highest level and technical expertise,
ed. Christine Sternberg Patrick. Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 2009, pp. 103–105]).
73.

Thomson, supra note 29, at 25–30, 36 (describing eighteenth-century
American gentleman’s education, including that of Secretary of State
Jefferson and future president John Adams, and noting the intellectual
abilities of the members of the Continental Congress, with emphasis on
scientific and technical learning).

74.

Federico, supra note 17, at 238.

75.

Thomson, supra note 29, at 2–3. Jefferson had been appointed Secretary
of State on September 26, 1789 and took office on March 22, 1790.
Malone, supra note 35, at 243 n.3; id. at 254–55.

76.

“From George Washington to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,” supra note
72; Neil Longley York, Mechanical Metamorphosis: Techno–
logical Change in Revolutionary America 112 (1985) (noting that
“technical knowledge . . . is the stock in trade of a professional military
engineer” in the late eighteenth century). In this period, the United States
lacked military schools, instead importing trained engineers from Europe to
assist the military during the Revolution. Id. at 112–13. For eighteenthcentury European engineering education, see Peter Lundgreen, Engineering
Education in Europe and the U.S.A., 1750–1930: The Rise to Dominance
of School Culture and the Engineering Professions, 47 Annals Science 33,
36, 41, 46, 52 (1990). For the founding of West Point as first US military
school in 1802, see id. at 52.

77.

Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10 (1790).
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enacted the nature and purpose of patents through the practical details
of petition processing.

II. Registration and William Thornton, 1793–1836
Despite the apparently large numbers of ungranted patent petitions
under the first patent regime, there is little evidence that many
inventors pushed for a change, another hint that perhaps some of the
ungranted petitions might have been abandoned rather than denied.78
It was rather the bureaucrats who complained. Given his other respon–
sibilities, Jefferson soon found himself “oppressed beyond measure” by
the duties of patent examination.79 By December 1791, Jefferson had
drafted a proposal for a simple registration system combined with a
robust publication requirement, that is, a plan to push all evaluation of
patents to the market and the courts.80
While Jefferson’s draft bill did not become law, in the Patent Act
of 1793, Congress abolished the patent board, replacing substantive
evaluation by high-ranking officials with a registration system for
patents under the supervision of the State Department.81 In place of
cabinet members, the State Department clerk was given the task of
78.

The four steamboat inventors were disgruntled by the result of their
petitions and the attorney for one of them published a pamphlet attacking
the patent system. Lubar, supra note 3, at 936 & n.11 (citing Joseph
Barnes, Treatise on the Justice, Policy, and Utility of
Establishing an Effectual System for Promoting the Progress
of Useful Arts 27–34 (1792)); Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 193; cf.
Edward C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 39
Essays in Hist. (1998), http://www.essaysinhistory.com/thomas-jeffersonand-the-patent-act-of-1793/ [https://perma.cc/2HVH-GZGP] (claiming
that inventors must have objected to the time-consuming nature of this
process and to the low issuance rates); Federico, supra note 17, at 250
(claiming without citation that “some persons” were unhappy that the
board did not grant patents “freely”).

79.

“From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson,” supra note 56; see also
Malone, supra note 35, at 281 (noting that patents were “the most timeconsuming of [Jefferson’s] domestic duties”).

80.

“A Bill to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts, [1 December 1791],”
Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Jefferson/01-22-02-0322 [Original source: The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson, vol. 22, 6 August 1791 – 31 December 1791, ed. Charles T. Cullen.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 359–362]; Malone, supra
note 35, at 285 (noting that Jefferson, in his draft bill, would have “reliev[ed]
himself of all except nominal functions”); Walterscheid, supra note 78
(calling Jefferson’s proposed publication requirements “onerous” and costly).

81.

Patent Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, §§ 1, 3, 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318–323
(1793) (requiring the Secretary of State to “cause letters patent to be
made out” to any inventor who pays a fee, swears that they have invented,
and delivers description to Secretary of State).
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processing patent applications.82 The new Patent Act switched the locus
of evaluation of the application from government officials to the
inventor, by requiring a signed, witnessed oath of the applicant that
they were the “true inventor.”83 Incorporating the Board’s extrastatutory practice, Congress now required “a written description of his
[sic] invention . . . in . . . full, clear and exact terms,” drawings, and a
model (if applicable) before the patent would be granted.84 Further, in
imitation of English practice, Congress also encouraged inventors to
evaluate the worth of their inventions by raising the application fee to
$30.85 If the paperwork was correctly submitted and the inventor paid
that sum, the patent was to be drafted and forwarded to the Secretary
of State for signature.86 While there was still no right to appeal a denial,
there was, as the Attorney General would repeatedly opine and the
courts confirm, also no statutorily recognized discretion to deny a
patent based on substance.87 Patents had, by Congressional mandate,
seemingly switched from privilege to a right “which the citizen may
demand, and which the officers of government have no power to
withhold.”88
This interpretation was based on the new statutory language. From
a statute offering unfettered discretion to consider the substance of an
invention, the United States had switched to a statute without examin–
ation or discretion. Substantive review was only ex post, in the federal
courts.89 A close examination of patent making under the earlier system
82.

Id. § 11.

83.

Id. § 3.

84.

Id.; see Biagioli, supra note 10, at 1149 (analyzing the significance of oath
and specification). Note that while the 1790 Act had used gender inclusive
language to refer to inventors, Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 1,
Stat. 109, 109–10 (1790) (“he, she, or they”), the 1793 Act used only “he
or they,” Patent Act of 1793 § 1.

85.

Patent Act of 1793 § 11; Bottomley, supra note 9, at 63 (showing
reliance on fees in lieu of examination). While a great increase, this fee
was still “among the lowest in the world in relation to per capita income.”
Khan, supra note 10, at 54.

86.

Patent Act of 1793 § 1 (indicating that once the inventor met the
requirements of submission, the Secretary “shall cause the seal of the
United States” to be “affixed” to the “letters patent”).

87.

See infra note 114 and accompanying text.

88.

Peter A. Browne, Mechanical Jurisprudence, No. 14, 3 Franklin J. &
Am. Mechanics’ Magazine 176 (March 1827) (lawyer describing US
patent as “constitutional right”).

89.

Court evaluation included the poorly understood judicial repeal procedure.
Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 668–69. Evaluating the role of the courts in
the patent system during this period, and into the first decades of the
nineteenth century, is difficult, as there were very few published patent
cases. There were only six reported United States patent decisions between
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revealed hints of procedures constraining discretion, as administrators
sought to manage their workload. A clerk’s eye view of the four decades
of the registration system shows bureaucrats seizing discretion. Again,
administrators in their enactment of the law shaped the nature and
purpose of patents.
Not surprisingly, while the increase in fees seems to have reduced
the number of petitions initially, with lowered barriers to a patent
grant, as well as the growing population of the United States, applic–
ations, and hence issued patents, soon began to increase.90 While the
State Department issued twenty-two patents under the new system in
1794, in 1801 there were forty-four.91 The paperwork for each had to be
collected, requiring correspondence with the applicant if they had failed
to submit all the required elements, and then the patent had to be
written out by hand.92 The patent workload became increasingly
onerous for the small State Department staff and, in 1802, then
Secretary of State James Madison, serving under now President
Thomas Jefferson, appointed William Thornton as the first federal
employee dedicated full-time to processing patent applications.93
Thornton kept his position until his death in 1828, allowing him ample
opportunity to shape the US patent system.94
Formally, Thornton was a clerk and his appointment did not
change the registration system.95 But he and others immediately termed
his role that of “Superintendent of Patents” and Thornton began
organizing a patent office, with dedicated space and staff.96 As in the
1800 and 1809, and a further thirty-seven cases between 1810 and 1819.
Khan, supra note 3, at 63. The situation did not change significantly in the
next decades. Khan finds thirty-six patent cases between 1820 and 1829 and
thirty-seven cases between 1830 and 1839. Id. Cf. Christopher Beauchamp,
The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 Yale L.J. 848, 854–56 (2016)
(noting a rapid increase after 1840 in patent case filings, as distinct from
reported decisions).
90.

U.S. Patent Activity: Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
h_counts.htm [https://perma.cc/U4HF-XG5U] (last modified Oct. 9,
2020) (utility patents granted per year).

91.

Id.

92.

Preston, supra note 4, at 344 (noting that Thornton sometimes had to ask
inventors for more details); see also Thornton Papers, supra note 50,
(scattered examples of correspondence with applicants).

93.

Preston, supra note 4, at 334.

94.

Id.

95.

Id. at 335.

96.

Id. at 335–37; “To James Madison from William Thornton, 27 November
1807,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.
gov/documents/Madison/99-01-02-2366 [Early Access document] (des–
cribing his role as “Superintendent of the Patent Office”). Cf. Entry in John
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prior patent regime, the nature of the man acting as a patent bureau–
crat mattered, although under the registration system it was the
Secretary of State rather than Congress who decided what sort of man
should fill the role. In choosing Thornton, Madison selected a man
similar to Jefferson in education, wealth, and accomplishments.
Thornton had the ability and interest to consider the content of patent
applications and to understand how patents were used by inventors and
investors.
Like Jefferson, Thornton had scientific and technical training, an
international perspective, and an ample inheritance.97 Born in the
British West Indies to a family whose wealth came from sugar
plantations worked by enslaved labor, Thornton had been raised in
England, trained as a physician in Edinburgh, and spent time in London
and Paris before emigrating to the United States, settling in
Philadelphia.98 He became close friends with Madison when they roomed
at the same boarding house while Madison was attending the
Constitutional Convention in 1787, and in Washington City they were
neighbors and jointly owned racehorses.99 He was also friends with
Washington and Jefferson.100 While living in Philadelphia, Thornton
had invested in Fitch’s steamboat company, beginning decades of
involvement with steamboat technology and the patent system.101
Thornton closely followed Fitch’s patent travails—which included the
disappointing decision of the patent board to award simultaneous
patents to all steamboat inventors—and advised him about patent
strategy. Thornton also considered himself an inventor of steamboat

Quincy Adams’s Diary (Dec. 27, 1804), supra note 50 (calling Thornton
“Commissioner of Patents”).
97.

These details of Thornton’s life are drawn from Beatrice Starr Jenkins,
William Thornton: Small Star of the American Enlightenment
(1982); Elinor Stearns & David N. Yerkes, William Thornton: A
Renaissance Man in the Federal City (1976); Allen C. Clark, Doctor
and Mrs. William Thornton, 18 Recs. Colum. Hist. Soc’y 144 (1915);
C.M. Harris, Biographical Sketch of William Thornton, from 1759 to 1802,
in Papers of William Thornton, Volume One, 1781–1802 xxxi-liii
(C.M. Harris, ed., 1995); Dobyns, supra note 4, at 53–56.

98.

Stearns & Yerkes, supra note 97, at 3; Jenkins, supra note 97, at v;
Harris, supra note 97, at xxxiii-xlii.

99.

Stearns & Yerkes, supra note 97, at 9; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 55.

100. Clark, supra note 97, at 169 (“Dr. Thornton was proud of the intimacy
with General Washington . . . .”); Stearns & Yerkes, supra note 97, at
38 (noting that Thomas Jefferson was “among the distinguished acquain–
tances and friends who visited” Thornton).
101. Harris, supra note 97, at xlv-xlvi; Clark, supra note 97, at 184.
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technology.102 After he won a competition to design the Capitol
Building, Thornton moved to Washington City and then served as a
Commissioner of the District of Columbia.103 It was when his term as
Commissioner ended that Madison appointed him to the patent
clerkship, allowing him to retain a federal salary.104 Despite Thornton’s
familial wealth, he struggled throughout his life to maintain funds
sufficient to support his expensive lifestyle, which included multiple
homes and enslaved servants.105
In reading and processing patent applications, Thornton was never
shy about exercising his elite expertise and drawing upon his extensive
social capital. The first patent bureaucrat to engage directly with the
patent system as an inventor and investor, he enacted a patent system
designed to serve “true inventor[s]” while regarding the broader public
with near hostility.106 While he occasionally acknowledged that the
public would benefit from the patent system, in Thornton’s artic–
ulations, any social benefit in the form of technological progress was
not so much the goal as an incidental result. To protect true inventors
and maintain the value of their patents, Thornton repeatedly exercised
his judgment about the substance of patent applications.
Although the patent system created by the 1793 Act is usually
described as a registration system requiring only low-level paperprocessing by bureaucrats, it in fact required substantive review. In
102. Sutcliffe, supra note 68, at 70, 76, 120; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 26, 67–
76.
103. Harris, supra note 97, at xlvii-li; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 54-55.
104. Harris, supra note 97, at liii; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 55. For discussions
of patent practice during Thornton’s tenure, see Dobyns, supra note 4, at
57, 60–66, 82–83, 92–106; William I. Wyman, Dr. William Thornton and
the Patent Office to 1836, in 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 83, 83–87 (1936);
Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 253; Preston, supra note 4, at 338–40.
105. For Thornton’s financial situation, see, for example, Dobyns, supra note
4, at 106, noting that Thornton “complain[ed] about his salary” until “[h]e
was very near the end of his life”; id. at 65, discussing Thornton’s financial
commitments and noting that Thornton “had received no money from his
property in the West Indies for two years.” In the 1790s, Thornton owned
“some 70 slaves” in Tortula. Charles M. Harris, William Thornton (17591828), Libr. of Cong. (2001), https://www.loc.gov/rr/print/adecenter/
essays/B-Thornton.html [https://perma.cc/YV77-Z48E]. Notes regarding
the purchase of slaves in the United States are included in the papers of
Thornton’s wife. See, e.g., entry of Feb. 27, 1796 (“bought a negro named
Tome”), Anna Maria Brodeau Thornton papers, 1793-1861, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. At one point, Thornton
owned a house, two farms, and a city garden. Dobyns, supra note 4, at
55.
106. Patent Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793)
(requiring applicant to swear they are the “true inventor” before receiving
patent).
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addition to ensuring each applicant had submitted every piece of
required paperwork, Thornton had to decide if a model was “necessary,”
which required reading to determine whether the claimed invention was
a machine that could be modeled.107 The new act also provided for
arbitration in the case of “interfering applications,” but provided no
guidance as to what it meant for applications to interfere.108 Again, that
was left to Thornton to decide based on the substance of each applic–
ation, drawing upon, presumably, some combination of his records of
pending applications (Thornton’s record keeping was often behind) and
his memory of applications he had read.109
Like Jefferson and the other board members, Thornton innovated
in extra-statutory ways during his two-decade tenure, both to make his
workload more tolerable and to promote his understanding of patents
and the patent system. He took the board’s repeated requests for
additional information and Jefferson’s “general rules” one step further,
issuing a booklet for patent applicants that described the requested
form and content of patent applications.110 He developed the practice of
accepting and filing caveats (a means of establishing priority of
invention in use in England) and of allowing patentees to seek
reissuance to correct errors, both of which practices were subsequently
formalized as part of patent law.111
These practices shaped the nature of granted patents. Reissuance
allowed the substance of a patent to change in ways Thornton believed
were protecting true inventors from errors, whether theirs or his, and
caveats rendered later applications non-novel, even though Thornton
lacked authority to deny applications on that ground. By incorporating
these ways of making patents, Thornton enacted his prioritization of
individual inventor rights over any broader concept of the public good.
Reissue practice, in particular, proved frustrating to businesses as it
107. Patent Act of 1793 §3.
108. Id. § 9.
109. Preston, supra note 4, at 336–37.
110. Patents, 6 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 97, 98 (1923) (reprint of 1811 version of
pamphlet). This practice would be ratified by Congress in 1870. Patent
Act of 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-230, § 19, 16 Stat. 198, 200 (1870).
111. Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, §§ 12 (caveats), 13 (reissuance), 5
Stat. 117, 121–22 (1836). According to patent attorney and historian Levin
H. Campbell, the practice of reissuance was first developed in 1817 and
confirmed in Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 244 (1832) (acknowledging
“settled practice”). Levin H. Campbell, Correspondence, 65 Sci. Am. 69
(1891); see also Kendall J. Dood, Pursuing the Essence of Inventions:
Reissuing Patents in the 19th Century, 32 Tech. & Culture 999, 999–1000
(1991). For British caveat practice, see Bottomley, supra note 9, at 53–54.
Post-grant corrections of patents continue to the present and provisional
applications have replaced the earlier caveats. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(b), 134(b),
318(a), 328(a) (2018).
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allowed the coverage of patents, and thus the possibility of infringe–
ment, to change throughout their term.112
Lacking explicit authority, Thornton repeatedly assumed authority,
enacting his own interpretation of the law. Most controversially, he was
unwilling to grant patents to inventions he believed were not new. He
made no secret of his activities, outlining them for then-Secretary of
State Robert Smith in 1810 as “labours perhaps . . . more . . . the duties
of conscience than of office.”113 His actions led some inventors to
complain to the Secretary of State and resulted in multiple Attorney
General opinions that Thornton (and the entire executive branch)
lacked the discretion to deny a patent to any petitioner who fulfilled
the paperwork requirements.114 Even after those rebukes, Thornton
continued to warn applicants in correspondence that their inventions
were not new or useful115 and if forced to issue such patents, he
sometimes changed the language of the patents he drafted to indicate
his distrust of their claimed novelty, adding terms such as “alleged” to
the statement that the named recipient was the true inventor and/or
noting anticipating prior art on the back of the document.116 In one
case, Thornton provoked a patentee into bringing a libel suit regarding
Thornton’s continued public insistence that a patent claiming the

112. Dood, supra note 111, at 1006 (noting that the practice was eventually
greatly curtailed).
113. “Letter from William Thornton to Robert Smith, Dec. 19, 1810,” in
Thornton Papers, supra note 50. For examples, “Letter from William
Thornton to Samuel Pitkin, April 7, 1806” (pricking machine not novel);
“[P]rotest” to Robert Fulton’s patent as not new, Feb. 8, 1811, each in
Thornton Papers, supra note 50; and those referenced in Walterscheid,
supra note 3, at 259, 260 n.54.
114. Nourse’s Case, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 575 (1822); digested in Stephen D. Law,
Digest of American Cases Relating to Patents for Invention and
Copyrights from 1789 to 1862, at 149 (5th ed. 1877). This opinion
limiting the State Department to ministerial rather than judicial action in
consideration of a patent application was reiterated after Thornton’s death.
See Patents, Patent Office, and Clerks, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 454, 454–55
(1831), digested in Law, supra, at 114. See also Grant, 31 U.S. at 241 (“The
[S]ecretary of [S]tate may be considered, in issuing patents, as a ministerial
officer. If the prerequisites of the law be complied with, he can exercise no
judgment on the question whether the patent shall be issued.”).
115. See Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 263 n.63.
116. For a summary of Thornton’s practice in this regard and for specific ex–
amples, see id. at 259–65; Dobyns, supra note 4, at 94, 98; Edward D.
Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon—An Early Patent Controversy, 79
J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 533, 536–38 (1997).
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beveling of one edge of a common piece of mill machinery, the “winged
gudgeon,” was invalid for lack of novelty.117
In his stubborn crusade to issue only patents that he believed would
be found valid in court, Thornton articulated a particular vision of the
purposes of the patent system and the harms poor administration
posed. He might have returned, like Jefferson, to the “benefit of
society,” arguing that invalid patents would allow patentees to extract
license fees for known technologies or to prosecute infringement suits,
costing Americans needless sums.118 Thomas Fessenden, for example,
author of the first US patent treatise, agreed with Thornton that
patents for old inventions were an “abuse” and also agreed that the
remedy was “due care in the regulation of the patent office,” advocating
“caution . . . not to grant patents for pseudo inventions.”119 The harm
from such an abuse, Fessenden thought, was the “deceit” to the
“public.”120 While Thornton agreed that such patents were “egregious
impositions” on the public, he focused much more on avoiding the
“ruin” of true inventors, among whom he saw himself.121 Thornton
thought the most serious harm was that false patents claiming all or
some of the true inventor’s invention would render the true inventor’s
grant almost worthless unless the true inventor engaged in expensive
litigation.122
Instead of worrying about whether the public was benefitted or
harmed by the grant of exclusive rights to inventors, Thornton
considered the public a source of threat to true inventors. To avoid this
threat, he had a policy of refusing to provide copies of unexpired patents
to anyone unless the patentee gave their permission.123 While the Patent
117. See generally Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon, supra note 116 (discuss–
ing the controversy and history).
118. See “From Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson,” supra note 30.
119. Thomas G. Fessenden, An Essay on the Law of Patents for New
Inventions xxxvi (1810).
120. Id.
121. “Letter from William Thornton to Robert Smith,” supra note 113; see also
“Letter from William Thornton to Caleb Kirk, June 10, 1817” (Thornton
describing himself as “bound in conscience to defend the public against the
direct and willful impositions of patentees”) in Thornton Papers, supra note
50.
122. “Letter from William Thornton to Robert Smith,” supra note 113 (noting
risk to patentees of “ruin”); see also Preston, supra note 4, at 343–44
(discussing difficulties of patent litigation).
123. See, e.g., “Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, Jan. 23, 1809”
and “Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, Feb. 15, 1809” (reit–
erating his policy of only providing copies of issued patents with patentee
permission) in Thornton Papers, supra note 50; see also Walterscheid,
supra note 3, at 282–85; Preston, supra note 4, at 341. Id. at 341.
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Act of 1790 had provided for the availability of patents to the public,124
the Patent Act of 1793 had omitted this provision and Thornton took
the position that it required him only to provide copies of disputed
patents to litigating parties.125 To Thornton, the information contained
in the patents was not a building block for further American innovation,
but rather a set of instructions to infringers that would allow them to
set up competing businesses, or worse yet, to file copycat patent
applications which he then would be unable to deny.126 Given the
primitive state of internal transportation, there was some basis for
Thornton’s fear that a true inventor might lose potential licensing
revenues to infringing competitors in distant states without any
knowledge of such loss—and of course, the remedy even if such loss
were discovered was expensive and time-consuming litigation. Thornton
preferred to allow each inventor to control information about the details
of their invention, rather than to consider the files of the Patent Office
as a public resource.
As with his attempts to refuse patents for lack of novelty, Thornton
repeatedly lost on this point. In 1809, the Attorney General ordered
Thornton to give copies of patents upon request, subject only to
payment of copying fees.127 He nevertheless continued the policy until
he was challenged again in 1824 by a group of well-connected men
committed to the idea that the public should have access to issued
patents as a means of promoting the progress of American technology.
Thornton’s fight with the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia, which
sought to publish copies of patents in its journal, precipitated a monthslong battle that reached all the way to President John Quincy Adams
before Thornton again had to capitulate.128
124. Patent Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 3, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (1790).
125. Preston, supra note 4, at 340–41; Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 283. See
also “Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, Jan. 23, 1809” and
“Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, Feb. 15, 1809,” supra note
123 (reiterating his policy of only providing copies of issued patents with
patentee permission).
126. Cf. Eric Robinson, James Watt and the Law of Patents, 13 Tech. &
Culture 115, 130–31 (1972) (explaining that in the late eighteenth
century, James Watt, English inventor and patentee, expressed similar
concerns about the uses of patent specifications).
127. “Letter from William Thornton to John Stevens, July 8, 1809” (noting
Attorney General’s “answer in favour of those who have applied for copies
of Patents”), in Thornton Papers, supra note 50; see also Walterscheid,
supra note 3, at 284–85; Delivering Copies of Specifications of Patents, 1
Op. Att’y Gen. 171 (1812), digested in Law, supra note 114, at 206
(reiterating an unpublished 1809 opinion requiring Thornton to produce
copies upon request).
128. Thornton won an opening skirmish, see Right of Citizens to Copies of
Papers Respecting Patents, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 718, 719 (1825)(recognizing
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Thornton’s career making patents is striking in two regards. First,
because of who he was, he persistently defied the law and his superiors
to shape the patent system and hence patents in accordance with his
own views, secure in his position. Second, despite having lost every
battle, Thornton ultimately won the war with respect to the ability of
and necessity for patent bureaucrats to judge the content of
applications. In his defiance, Thornton had enacted an approach to
making patents that Fessenden and others admired, that is, ex ante
substantive review.
After Thornton’s death, the registration system became increas–
ingly destabilized. There were three Patent Superintendents in the next
seven years.129 The first, Thomas Jones, formerly a professor of natural
philosophy and chemistry at the College of William and Mary, and
later, first editor of the Franklin Institute’s journal, continued to review
the substance of applications.130 Like Thornton, he suggested that
applicants withdraw their applications when he believed their claimed
inventions were already known, advising them not to spend further
money for what would be worthless patents.131 This version of advisory
ex ante review skirted the Superintendent’s lack of authority to deny a
patent. His successor, John Craig, previously a teacher and headmaster
in Baltimore, however, refused even to read applications, using his
statutory lack of discretion as a reason to reduce his workload.132 This
refusal to exercise any ex ante review resulted in a failure to declare
interferences, leading to even more invalid patents.133 The third, Colonel
James Pickett, a former diplomat lacking any relevant technical
expertise, reportedly relied on long-time employee Charles Keller to

discretion to deny copies of patents granted to others) but ultimately lost
after Secretary of State Henry Clay intervened. Walterscheid, supra
note 3, at 289–304; Bruce Sinclair, Philadelphia’s Philosopher
Mechanics: A History of the Franklin Institute, 1824–1865, at
29-30, 32, 42–45 (1974)(describing backgrounds of founders and officers
and fight with Thornton); Preston, supra note 4, at 340–42.
129. For an overview of the Superintendents in this period, see Dobyns, supra
note 4, at 107–24; Preston, supra note 4, at 351.
130. Sinclair, supra note 128, at 54-56.
131. Testimony of Thomas P. Jones, in Louis McLane, Report
Secretary of State: In Compliance with a Resolution of
of May, with Documents Relating to the Conduct
Superintendent of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 23-398,
(1st Sess. 1834).
132. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 113, 116.
133. Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 263.
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exercise advisory ex ante review about the novelty of claimed inven–
tions.134
Overall, these successors lacked the political connections and social
clout to persist in Thornton’s emphatic civil disobedience. Jones and
Craig (Pickett only held the position for three months) each faced
rebellion and criticism from their staff, particularly from Thornton
hold-overs, leading eventually led to their dismissal.135 By 1835, when
Craig was dismissed, Keller was the most experienced Patent Office
employee.136 He drew upon that experience, including six years of
working under Thornton, to draft a set of proposed Patent Office
reforms.137 Keller, however, as a self-educated machinist, had even less
ability than Thornton’s successors to turn his ideas into legally
sanctioned practice.138 With the appointment of Henry Ellsworth, a
dedicated administrator, as the fourth successor to Thornton in 1835
and the Washington arrival of John Ruggles, newly elected Senator
from Maine and aspiring patentee, Keller found men with the necessary
social capital and access to power to once again change the role of the
patent bureaucrat.139 Drawing upon two decades of Thornton
demonstrating that a technically savvy bureaucrat could sort claimed
inventions into novel and non-novel categories without undue
“oppression” to himself, Keller offered the lessons of practical exper–
ience that Ruggles used to inform a new US patent law and the creation
of the modern Patent Office.

III. Bureaucratic Expertise, 1836–1860
To begin the process of statutory reform, Ruggles chaired a Senate
committee on the patent system and quickly issued a report, describing
the problems and proposing a full-time patent examiner as the
solution.140 He agreed with Thornton that the chief problems were the
134. Thaddeus Hyatt, Charles M. Keller and the American Patent Office, 14
Sci. Am. 310 (1859) (letter to editor about Keller’s duties).
135. See Dobyns, supra note 4, at 109–11, 115–21.
136. Id. at 124.
137. Hyatt, supra note 134, at 310.
138. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 119.
139. Id. at 124–25, 127, 131; Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 27 (crediting
Keller); Preston, supra note 4, at 351 (crediting Ellsworth); The Patent
Act of 1836, J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 91, 95–96 (1936); Ruggles, John (17891874), Biographical Directory of the U.S. Cong., http://bio
guideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=R000502
[https://perma.cc/6389-29B4] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
140. John Ruggles, Select Committee Report on the State and
Condition of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4 (1st Sess.
1835); Walterscheid, supra note 3, at 422–23. The entire Senate Report
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“evils” resulting from “the unrestrained and promiscuous grant of
patent[s].”141 He concluded: “The most obvious . . . means [to prevent
these evils] appears to be to establish a check upon granting of patents,
allowing them to issue only for such inventions as are in fact new and
entitled, by the merit of originality and utility, to be protected by
law.”142 Ruggles identified three questions that this “obvious” solution
raised: (1) what the nature of the “check” on patents should be, (2) “in
whom the power to judge of inventions before granting a patent can
safely be reposed,” and (3) how these judge-like actors could be
“regulated and guarded to prevent injustice . . . [to] honest and
meritorious inventors.”143
The first two questions were familiar. Since 1790, the “check”
perennially under debate had been patent bureaucrats and Ruggles’
innovation of the examiner continued that approach.144 The identity of
those bureaucrats had swung from department heads to lowly clerks
and then, with Thornton’s appointment, had been modified to a midlevel Superintendent of Patents. Madison’s selection of a man with
technical qualifications had been another bureaucratic innovation that
largely persisted after Thornton’s death, even if his successors had not
been intimate friends of presidents.145 In proposing full-time patent
examiners, Ruggles imagined that this tradition would continue,
describing the new position with “the power to judge of inventions” as
“altogether above a mere clerkship,” needing “the exercise and applic–
ation of much scientific acquirement and knowledge of the existing state
of the arts in all their branches.”146 In Jacksonian America, however,
unlike in the Federalist years of the Washington administration, this
tradition would come under new scrutiny. The assumption of govern–
ment by a natural aristocracy had weakened and access to the growing
number of federal jobs was hotly contested. Jacksonian Democrats
explicitly espoused rotation in office and the accessibility of civil service

is reprinted in 1836 Senate Committee Report, 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y
853 (1936).
141. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Cf. Beauchamp, supra note 20, at 664 (arguing that courts had
participated as a check through repeal process).
145. Preston, supra note 4, at 351 (noting Jones and Craig had technical
qualifications, although Pittsfield, who remained in the office less than a
year, did not, nor did Ellsworth, who was given a staff of technically trained
examiners).
146. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4.
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jobs to all.147 By requiring qualifications for examiners that were rare in
the young republic, the Patent Office risked a return to government by
elites.
A staunch Jacksonian, Ruggles articulated this attitude about
officeholders in his third, new, question about patent administration.148
Although aware that a “flood” of false “patent monopolies” was
“embarrassing to the community generally,” Ruggles, like Thornton,
focused on harm to “honest and meritorious inventors” who, even
though able to get a patent readily under the registration system, still
struggled to profit from their invention when others could patent the
same invention, leaving them only the remedy of expensive litigation.149
In suggesting ex ante review, Ruggles remained focused on the inventor
rather than the community, identifying a new potential harm: unwarr–
anted denials. Rather than assuming that those who became examiners,
as natural aristocrats bound by a code of honor, had the proper skills
and attitude to perform without need for review, Ruggles suggested
that examiners needed to be “regulated and guarded” to avoid
“injustice.”150 Almost a half century after Jefferson had become the first
patent bureaucrat, Ruggles sought to temper administrative discretion
with oversight. His solution, enacted into law, was an appellate tribunal
within the office to consider allegedly improper denials, soon amended
to include judicial review.151 This legal change was a significant step in
supporting patents as rights, but it was not sufficient. As under
previous regimes, there were still practical details left to the
bureaucrats.
In the Jacksonian anti-monopoly and anti-privilege philosophy of
universal access to government largesse, from jobs to corporate charters,
it was not only the new position of patent examiner with its requirement
of expertise that was potentially troublesome.152 Patents themselves fit
only awkwardly in this philosophy. In his report, Ruggles suggested
that the patent system should “secure [patents] to all descriptions of
persons, without discrimination.”153 Patents, albeit exclusive rights,
147. Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative
History, 1829–1861, at vii, 300–01 (1954).
148. Ruggles, John (1789-1874), supra note 139.
149. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 3–4.
150. Id. at 4. For the “culture of honor” of early American politicians, see
Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the
New Republic xv (2001).
151. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4, 6; Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, § 11,
5 Stat. 117, 121 (1836).
152. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 210-11; Hovenkamp, supra note
3, at 270–71.
153. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 1.
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were to be universally available entitlements, granted without “partial–
ity or favouritism,” rather than discretionary privileges.154 Expertisebased bureaucratic discretion was not the same, he implicitly argued,
as undemocratic discrimination. At the same time, Ruggles acknowl–
edged that ex ante review would result in fewer patents. Some of those
“all descriptions of persons” would be denied patents, even after
appeal.155 The universal right to a patent came with fine print: no
patent if the applicant did not convince an examiner the invention was
useful and, particularly, novel.
As Herbert Hovenkamp has suggested, the examination system
initiated in 1836 persisted as the form of the patent system because
Ruggles’ interpretation prevailed.156 Despite ex ante review that
resulted in some rejections, patents achieved a status as rights rather
than privileges. Under the modern examination process, the government
grant of exclusivity to inventors has been largely accepted as “nondis–
cretionary” and “free from capture,” successfully creating a “patent
exceptionalism” from the hostility toward monopolies both in the Age
of Jackson and well into the twentieth century.157 This state of affairs,
however, was not simply a matter of legislative enactment, even
supported by judicial decisions.158 The first examiners and the newly
designated Commissioner of Patents had to experiment with exercising
their “power to judge” and negotiate the hiring of examiners.159
The new system had immediate, highly visible results. The number
of patents issued per year dropped precipitously, from 737 in 1835 to
435 in 1837, with the Commissioner estimating that allowance rates
had dropped from nearly 100% to about 66%.160 As Ruggles had hoped,
the perception of patents also shifted, with an apparent increased
confidence in their commercial value.161 The “honest and meritorious
154. “From Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson,” supra note 56; accord
Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 212.
155. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 1.
156. Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 270.
157. Id. at 271, 275, 306; accord Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at
209.
158. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 215–16 (arguing that the
privilege framework was not swept away by the 1836 Act but required
judicial development of the utility doctrine).
159. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4. Ellsworth became the first Commissioner, and
Keller the first examiner, although within four months, Ellsworth was
suggesting a second examiner was needed. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 136,
141–42.
160. Henry Ellsworth, Report from the Commissioner of Patents,
H.R. Doc. No. 80, at 1 (3d sess. 1838).
161. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 6; B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth Sokoloff, History
Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in
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inventor” was in a stronger position to commercialize an invention
through a patent because of ex ante review.162 Yet the inventive comm–
unity agreed with Ruggles that unwarranted denials were a harm and,
unsurprisingly, felt that any rejections experienced by themselves or
their clients were unwarranted, a harm against which agency and court
review was not a sufficient guard.163 Every applicant thought of
themselves an “honest and meritorious inventor,” unaware that their
“ignorance of . . . the state of the arts and manufactures, and of the
inventions made in other countries” might make them not a “true
inventor.”164
This tension led, for the first time, to criticism about the type of
man given this “power to judge.”165 As has been documented by Robert
Post, the nation’s largest patent agency, Munn & Co., led a public
campaign against examiners.166 The criticism, largely contained within
the pages of Scientific American, a weekly newspaper published by the
agency, was not that ex ante review was a mistake.167 Rather, the
critique was that the men selected as examiners were too elite and that
they were judging inventions too stringently.168 In the battle against
“illiberal” “scientific men,” the patent commissioner and examiners
again helped shape what patents were and the purposes of the patent
system.169
Among congressmen and the first patent commissioners, there was
initial broad support for examiners to be highly qualified, scientifically
trained men, men whose credentials were as elite as those of Jefferson
and Thornton. Ruggles reiterated the “rare” qualifications needed after
the new system had been in effect for six months (and after Ruggles
had received his own patent):
the United States, 15 J. Econ. Persps. 233, 239 (2001) (arguing that an
increase in patent assignments demonstrated increased market value).
162. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4.
163. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 29.
164. S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 3.
165. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 27.
166. Id. at 34.
167. For more on Munn & Co. and the Scientific American, see Michael Borut,
The Scientific American in Nineteenth Century America 135–36 (Apr. 15,
1977) (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (ProQuest).
168. Although the debate was not phrased in this way at the time, it can be
viewed as an argument over the “person skilled in the art,” Patent Act of
1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836), insofar as the
“scientific men” were charged with using the wrong standard to review
applications, by using their elite knowledge rather than that of an artisan,
that is, one skilled in the art.
169. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 40, 42.
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An efficient and just discharge of the duties, it is obvious, requires
extensive scientific attainments, and a general knowledge of the
arts, manufactures, and the mechanism used in every branch of
business in which improvements are sought to be patented, and
of the principles embraced in the ten thousand inventions
patented in the United States, and of the thirty thousand
patented in Europe.170

As Congress expanded the number of examiner positions, applicants
sought to win the coveted jobs by soliciting recommendations from
scientific elites testifying to their qualifications.171 Edmund Burke, who
became commissioner in 1846, claimed that “[t]he great body of the
enlightened inventors of this country . . . desire earnestly that the men
who are to pass upon their valuable rights shall be not only men of
integrity, but of the highest order of talents and scientific
qualifications.”172 Into the 1850s, the examiners were men of high
attainment, separated in their knowledge and formal education from
inventors, who usually lacked formal technical training.173 Inventors
might be “all descriptions of persons,” but examiners were not.174 When
applying for a patent, the Jacksonian common man met rare men in
the Patent Office, men who sat in judgment on each application and
might reject it based on information written in a language the applicant
could not read.
As patent allowance rates continued to drop, Burke might have
been engaging in wishful thinking when he asserted that the majority
of inventors were happy with this hiring policy. The Scientific Amer–
ican reported on personnel changes of Commissioners and examiners
and frequently commented on the qualifications and performance of

170. S. Comm. Rep. No. 24-58, at 6 (2d Sess. 1837). Ruggles received the first
patent under the 1836 act. U.S. Patent No. 1 (July 13, 1836). For the
qualifications of examiners appointed by Ellsworth and his successors, Post,
“Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 31–33.
171. For example, Titian Peale obtained recommendations from Joseph Henry
and Alexander Dulles Bache, two of the preeminent men of science of the
day. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 41. For expansion of examiner
positions, see Swanson, supra note 4, at 52.
172. Edmund Burke, Report of the Commissioner of Patents, H.R.
Doc. No. 29-140, at 5 (1st Sess. 1846); see also speech by Congressman
Dickinson, Debate on a Bill to Increase Force and Salaries in the Patent
Office, 1 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 588, 594 (1919) (reprinting the debates as
excerpted from the Congressional Globe).
173. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 31–33, 37–39, 47–48 (qualifications
of examiners); Khan, supra note 10, at 126 (demographics of patentees).
174. “All descriptions of persons” did not, for the most part, include white
women or persons of color. See Swanson, supra note 11.
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each.175 The “scientific men” in the Patent Office were collectively
blamed for perpetrating injustice on honest inventors through too
frequent denials, with some individual examiners derided as especially
“illiberal,” that is, too apt to misuse their expertise to refuse patents
for inventions that any mechanically minded man would find novel.176
Critics accused the “scientific men” of exercising unfettered discretion,
not sufficiently “regulated and guarded.”177 With only a handful of
examiners, the Scientific American through its large patent agency
would have been able to collect experiences with each. In its pages, it
noted the difference in allowance rates among examiners to prove
unlawful discretion.178 A rejection, one disappointed patent solicitor
charged, was the result of the “will and whim of individuals,” tipping
patents back toward royal privileges rather than rights accessible to
all.179
Henry Renwick, an examiner with engineering training from
Columbia College, sought to counter this perception by explaining in
1850 how he and his colleagues sought to “aid[] and assist[] [the
inventor], as far as possible, to cover every inch of ground to which he
has clear title.”180 Yet Renwick also stressed that “the duties that this
office . . . owes to the public” required that only those “who have
contributed to the arts” receive patents and that no “monopol[ies]”
could be granted except for things “new and useful [and] heretofore
undescribed.”181 Repeating Thornton and Ruggles’ argument, Renwick
reminded readers that avoiding invalid patents would also benefit
patentees, for “when the deed for that title is granted,” cautious
examination of subsequent applications would ensure that a patentee
175. The multiple Scientific American articles on the Patent Office during this
period are summarized and cited in Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at
39–46 (also citing attention to patent office personnel decisions in American
Polytechnic Journal (1853-54) and the general interest New York Tribune).
176. Id. at 24 (citing Scientific American, Jan. 3, 1857).
177. John Ruggles, Select Committee Report on the State and
Condition of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4 (1st Sess.
1835).
178. Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 50.
179. Charles G. Page, The Patent Office—No. V, 1 Am. Polytechnic J. 327,
328 (1853). Page, a former patent examiner, left the office and went into
business as a patent agent. Post, Physics, Patents, and Politics,
supra note 6, at 137.
180. H. B. Renwick, Report, in Thomas Ewbank, Report of the
Commissioner of Patents for the Year 1850, H.R. Exec. Doc. No.
31-32, at 325 (2d. Sess. 1851); see also Post, Physics, Patents, and
Politics, supra note 6, at 116–17, 127 (detailing Renwick’s credentials and
the attacks on him).
181. H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 31-32, at 324–25.
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“is not harassed and ruined by the grant of other titles.”182 In some
exasperation, Renwick stated: “it is a common misapprehension . . . to
suppose this office is established . . . to afford facilities to . . . every
person who may find it convenient to make application for patent.”183
Mixing real property analogies with the specter of harmful monopolies,
Renwick struggled to justify his actions as examiner and explain the
nature of the rights he and his colleagues created by suggesting that
the examiners owed “duties” to the public as well as to each applicant.
Albeit in a context very different from Jefferson, a wealthy property
owner serving as Secretary of State, Renwick, a bureaucrat dependent
on a government job to support himself, articulated a duty to guard
the public against unwarranted monopolies. This re-articulation of the
public purpose of the patent system was now presented as in balance
with a Thornton-like concern with each inventor, who needed to be
aided and freed from harassment.
Renwick and his fellow bureaucrats found their assertion of the
joint purposes of the patent system a tough sell. Their critics focused
only on inventor rights and the need to protect them not from the
rapacious public Thornton had feared, but rather from the patent
administrators themselves. The proposed solution was to replace the
rare men of science with common men as examiners who would, it was
argued, exercise their discretion more properly, that is, less often.184
During the tenure of Charles Mason as Commissioner of Patents from
1853 to 1857, this approach to personnel gained a powerful ally in
Secretary of Interior Robert McClelland, Mason’s supervisor.185
McClelland sought control of Patent Office hiring to expand his
patronage network.
In Washington of the 1850s, the “spoils system” of awarding
government jobs to political allies was firmly entrenched, supported by
a powerful blend of raw political self-interest and high-minded
Jacksonian philosophy advocating government by the common man and
rotation in office.186 With McClelland’s goal of awarding Patent Office
182. Id. at 325.
183. Id. at 324.
184. Post, Physics, Patents, and Politics, supra note 6, at 120–21.
185. Mason’s tenure is chronicled in Dobyns, supra note 4, at 189–97; Leila
Sellers, Commissioner Mason and Clara Barton, 22 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y
803 (1940); and N.J. Brumbaugh, Charles Mason, Commissioner of
Patents, 1853–57, 2 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 122 (1919). Note that the Patent
Office had been transferred from the State Department to the newly created
Department of Interior by the Act of March 3, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395 (1849)
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1451).
186. Martha Barris Taylor, History of the Federal Civil Service,
1789 to the Present 16–31 (1941); Paul P. Van Riper, History of
the United States Civil Service 41–42 (1958); Robert Maranto &
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jobs to build his party connections aligned with the goal of the inventive
community to hire less scientifically-minded examiners in order to
increase the rate of application acceptance, Mason fought a losing battle
to hire and retain scientific men, resigning twice in disgust over
McClelland’s interference with personnel decisions.187 When Mason left
the office for good with a change in presidential administration in 1857,
his successor fired most of the examiners, replacing them with some of
the non-scientific men clamoring for federal jobs, and patent allowance
rates rose.188 The examiner became one of the multitude, rather than
one of the elite.
Mason’s replacement as Commissioner, Joseph Holt, who himself
received the position as a political reward,189 described the new state of
affairs in 1858:
This . . . admirable system . . . wisely avoids the laxity of
European laws, which grant patents, as of course, on all
applications, upon payment of the fees, and leave their value to
be subsequently tested by the impoverishing process of protracted
litigation. As decidedly, on the other hand, does it eschew that
stern, unsympathizing, distrusting temper, which would receive
the inventor as a stranger beneath the roof of this magnificent
edifice . . . . [T]he happy medium between these two equally
pernicious extremes . . . [that] welcom[es] the inventor as a friend
and patron, in that frank and free conference with him enjoined
by law, [and] kindly and anxiously sifts from his invention its
minutest patentable features, is a policy essentially American in
its origin and aims, and must be inflexibly maintained . . . .190

Holt lauded the “inherent and irrepressible energy of the national
mind” that was bringing ever more applications to the Patent Office as
the nation industrialized.191 When these irrepressibly inventive
Americans came to their Patent Office, the examiners avoided both the
Scylla of “impoverishing” litigation that resulted from the absence of
ex ante review and the Charybdis of “stern, unsympathizing, distrust–
ing” examination by an illiberal elite that might deny a patent to a true

David Schultz, A Short History of the United States Civil
Service 18, 29–31 (1991).
187. Dobyns, supra note 4, at 193, 197; Sellers, supra note 185, at 823, 825.
188. See Post, “Liberalizers,” supra note 6, at 48–50, 52.
189. Biographical Sketches of the Commissioners of Patents, 18 J. Pat. Off.
Soc’y 145, 156 (1936).
190. Joseph Holt, Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the
Year 1857, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 35-32, at 2 (1st Sess. 1858).
191. Id.
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inventor.192 As a “friend,” the examiner now processed applications in
a “kindly” way with the goal of finding the “minutest patentable
features.”193 The examiner no longer was superior to the inventor by
rare attainments. Instead, it was the inventor who was the “patron” of
the examiner, whose job it was to work for inventors.194
By 1860, then, via hiring practices, the day-to-day work of
examiners had been adjusted by reconfiguring the who rather than the
how. The result was a combination of perception (non-elite kindly
examiners) and reality (a rise in patent allowance rates) that promoted
patents as accessible rights rather special privileges. The equalization
of inventors and examiners as members of the inherently inventive
public allowed patents to remain an “admirable” and “essentially
American” good in an era of the triumph of universality and access–
ibility as key democratic virtues.195 By careful attention to “patentable
features” and rising allowance rates, Holt considered his office to be
supporting “a movement in the direction of the highest type of
civilization,” the progress of the useful arts that would relieve “the
masses of mankind . . . from the pressures of ceaseless toil.”196 Careful
protection of individual inventor rights would result in cumulative
social benefit.
Holt also highlighted the way his staff worked to implement their
mandate. Since the passage of the 1836 Act, the examiners had been
developing the process of what today is known as prosecution, now
formalized through “office actions” and the back-and-forth of claim
rejection, cancellation, and amendment.197 They had the statutory
authority, in addition to rejecting applications outright for lack of nov–
elty, to suggest that an applicant “alter[] his specification to embrace
only that part of the invention . . . which is new.”198 Holt emphasized
that examiners “anxiously” worked to identify even the “minutest

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2–3.
197. Responding to Office Actions, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., https://
www.uspto.gov/patents-maintaining-patent/responding-office-actions
[https://perma.cc/E8V7-L5GE] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020) (“An Office
action is written correspondence from the patent examiner that requires a
properly signed written response from the applicant in order for prosecution
of the application to continue”). See generally Manual of Patent
Examination Procedure, supra note 33 (detailing the current process of
patent prosecution).
198. Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20 (1836).
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patentable features” in otherwise non-novel inventions.199 This approach
greatly increased the chance that anyone who found it “convenient” to
apply for a patent could receive one.200 Like the actions of earlier
bureaucrats, this generous interpretation of the legislative mandate
would shape the patent law, this time by modification rather than
ratification. After the Civil War, courts developed the “invention”
doctrine, now known as non-obviousness, to limit patents on technically
trivial inventions, requiring examiners to be a little less kind as they
combed an application looking for patentable features.201

Conclusion
As the subsequent development of the invention doctrine
demonstrates, the patent system, including its bureaucracy, continued
to evolve after 1860. The triumph of the spoils system in Patent Office
hiring was not the final chapter in patent administration, any more
than the Patent Act of 1836 was the final legislative guidance.202 The
solutions that McClelland and Holt chose—hiring based on political
patronage and an examination process geared toward to finding
something patentable in as many applications as possible—both
changed after the Civil War. While it was the judiciary that imposed
the requirement that inventions be non-obvious, it was patent
commiss–ioners who returned to hiring based on technical expertise.203
These new approaches, however, did not reignite tensions about ex
ante review in the Patent Office. The perception that examiners
199. H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 35-32, at 2.
200. H. B. Renwick, Report, in Thomas Ewbank, Report of the Commiss–
ioner of Patents for the Year 1850, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 31-32, at
324 (2d. Sess. 1851).
201. Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 3, at 227–29 (noting that although
the concept was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1850 in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, it did not become significant until later).
202. The contours of the examination system created in 1836 have remained
through wholesale reenactments of the patent law in 1870 and 1952, as
well as a major revision in 2011. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §§2, 31, 16
Stat. 198, 198, 202 (1870); Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, §§ 131–35, 66
Stat. 792, 801–02 (1952); America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 11229, § 7, 125 Stat. 284, 313–15 (2011).
203. Note that in 1952, the non-obviousness doctrine was ratified by Congress
(Patent Act of 1952 §103), and the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed
that section 103 encompassed the previous decades of case law on the
topic. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1966). Note also that in
1870, Congress mandated that examiners-in-chief (although not the three
lesser grades) should be “persons of competent legal knowledge and
scientific ability.” Patent Act of 1870 §10. See also Patent Act of 1952
§7.
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remained appropriately guarded and regulated was aided by the everincreasing size of the examining corps, a legislative response to a steady
increase in applications.204 The Patent Act of 1870 authorized almost
70 people in a proliferating range of examining positions.205 It thus
became more difficult for those outside the office to follow hiring
decisions and compare individual allowance rates. With less public
scrutiny, commissioners experimented with the first merit-based hiring
practices within the federal civil service, implementing exams beginning
in 1868 to test technical knowledge.206 These tests, a commissioner
claimed, allowed self-taught “persons having that natural interest in
mechanism” as well as those formally educated to compete for examiner
jobs.207 Further, by 1878, the commissioner described a fifty-seven step
process which detailed the movement of a patent application through
the office, from the draftsmen, who examined the drawings for statutory
conformance, to the clerks for recording filing dates and fees, to the
examiners for substantive review, and round again, accumulating
paperwork and notations at each step until the patent was ready for
issuance.208 This process, published in the annual report to Congress,
suggested procedural guards and regulations on the discretion of patent
204. U.S. Patent Activity: Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, supra note 90
(after decrease in both annual applications and granted patents during
the first years of the Civil War, both increased beginning in 1864). See
also Dobyns, supra note 4, at 172 (noting that 1867 was the first year
the Patent Office issued over 10,000 patents).
205. Patent Act of 1870 § 2 (creating first and second assistant examiners, as
well as principal examiners).
206. Special Correspondence of the Scientific American – Affairs at the Patent
Office, 19 Sci. Am. 180 (Sept. 16, 1868)(noting examinations conducted
under Commissioner Foote); Samuel S. Fisher, Report of the
Commissioner of Patents for the Year 1869, H.R. Exec. Doc. No.
41-102, at 6–7 (2d Sess. 1870) (explaining competitive examinations in use
and results); Samuel A. Duncan, Report of the Commissioner of
Patents for the Year 1870, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 41-89, at 11–12 (3d
Sess. 1871)(praising results of Fisher’s examinations); Dobyns, supra note 4,
at 232; William I. Wyman, Samuel Sparks Fisher: Commissioner of Patents,
1869-1870, 2 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 490, 492–94 (1920); see also Pendleton Act
of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (enacting general civil service reform, including
selective examinations). Note that the Scientific American reported earlier
examination of clerk applicants. Our Editorial Correspondence, 4 Sci. Am.
266 (April 27, 1861)(n.s.).
207. Ellis Spear, Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the Year
1877, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 45-61, at ix (2d Sess. 1878). See also H.R.
Exec. Doc. No. 41-102, at 7 (reporting education and experience of top 4
candidates in two examination cycles as showing that both “the practical
and theoretical” perform well on the exam).
208. H.E. Paine, Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the
Year 1878, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 45-48, at ix–xii (3d Sess. 1879).
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bureaucrats, making their decisions a result of the uniform application
of general principles rather than “will and whim.”209 While quietly
wielding expertise to judge the substance of applications, the Patent
Office bureaucrats did their best to standardize themselves and their
practices and to convince the public of their standardization.
The mid-nineteenth-century “injustice” of individual men, with
publicly reported histories and personal proclivities, gave way to a
faceless mass of examiners, operating by a rote process, invisible within
a virtuous dullness.210 Because of these negotiated approaches to hiring
and procedure, throughout the twentieth century and into the twentyfirst, patent administration has seemed a “grey, technical realm.”211 The
delicate balance enacted via kindly attention to inventors resulting in
the liberal dispersal of individual exclusive rights as a means of serving
the public has been aided by twentieth-century judicial decisions
repeatedly suggesting that the office lacks the discretion to consider
sweeping issues of the public good.212
In restoring the patent bureaucracy to the antebellum history of
patents, this Essay provides a historical context for present-day contro–
versies about the nature and purpose of patents.213 I have described the
209. Page, supra note 179, at 328.
210. John Ruggles, Select Committee Report on the State and
Condition of the Patent Office, S. Doc. No. 24-338, at 4 (1st Sess.
1835).
211. Biagioli, supra note 10, at 1130. See also Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra
note 3, at 303–04 (describing increase of patent bureaucracy as facilitating
the “legalization” of patent prosecution, leading to patents becoming
“formal, textual artifacts”).
212. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316–18 (1980) (approving
the grant of a patent to genetically modified organism and suggesting that
a question of potential harm from such organisms is a question for Congress,
but irrelevant to interpreting the doctrine of patentable subject matter);
see also Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The
Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 Md. L. Rev. 1051
(1988); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising
from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 282–85 (2000)
(both arguing against Patent Office consideration of the social benefit or
harm that might result from biotech inventions); Lionel Bentley & Brad
Sherman, The Ethics of Patenting: Towards a Transgenic Patent System,
3 Med. L. Rev. 275, 275–76 (1995) (noting that neutrality of patent law
in US and elsewhere was being challenged by calls to consider ethics of
biotechnology); Shobita Parthasarathy, Patent Politics: Life
Forms, Markets & the Public Interest in United States & Europe
2, 13-14, 22 (2017)(noting that in US, “the inventor’s interest . . . was the
public interest”).
213. In addition to the sources cited supra note 15, see also Parthasarathy,
supra note 212, at 29–38, 48–49 (noting controversies throughout twentieth
century and tying this history to twenty-first century debates about
patenting life forms).
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seventy-year effort to embody and enact ex ante review of patent
applications in a way that was tolerable to bureaucrats, inventors, and
commercializers alike. Drama requiring presidential intervention,
attorney general opinions, and newspaper campaigns was sparked by—
and ultimately quelled by—patent administrators. In deciding how to
implement legislative mandates and in their embodiment both of state
power and technical expertise, bureaucrats influenced how patents were
perceived and the relative role of inventors and the public as benefic–
iaries of the patent system. Although this Essay does not develop all
we can learn from the clerk’s eye view, the history it surveys offers a
few suggestions.
One is that muddiness might offer some clarity. In the muddiness
of daily practical detail, patent administrators did not experience their
work as offering binary choices between privilege vs. right and/or public
good vs. individual benefit. Rather, administrators experienced these
views of patents and their purposes in the form of countervailing
tendencies about the exercise of discretion and beneficiaries of their
actions. Much of the time, in their actions, administrators emphasized
true inventors’ rights and benefits, trends shaped by the nature of
administration itself.214 To the patent clerk, the customers—inventors—
were more present and more important than an amorphous public or
constitutional expressions of purpose. Considering the muddiness of
motivations guiding those who made patents suggests that using such
binaries as analytic frames can obscure as well as clarify, over–
emphasizing oppositional aspects and underappreciating the continued
mixed motivations that drove making and using patents.
The second suggestion is that discretion is always present; it is the
means of talking about it that change. While the early wild pendulum
swings in both the degree and celebration of administrator discretion
have been replaced by a statutorily defined happy medium of neither
too much nor too little, no amount of procedure, hiring tests, or
expertise can remove will and whim.215 Rather, recent studies have
shown that examiners perform their duties differently, for example,
based on the perceived gender of applicants and their hopes for future
employment with the law firm representing an applicant.216
214. Jonathan S. Masur, Response, The PTO’s Future: Reform or Abolition?
158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 1, 2 (2009) (describing scholarship
analyzing the Patent Office as subject to “a type of [regulatory] capture by
the patent bar”). See also sources cited supra note 14 (discussion of regu–
latory capture of the Patent and Trademark Office).
215. Joseph Holt, Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the
Year 1857, H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 35-32, at 2 (1st Sess. 1858).
216. Kyle Jensen, Balázs Kovács & Olav Sorenson, Gender Differences in
Obtaining and Maintaining Patent Rights, 36 Nature Biotech. 307, 308
(2018) (perceived female inventors have less favorable outcomes on patent
applications); Haris Tabakovic & Thomas G. Wollmann, From Revolving
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As the gray, technical realm becomes newly visible with the release
of patent application processing metrics on a (anonymized) per
examiner basis, there is now renewed scrutiny of the who and how of
the patent bureaucrat. This scrutiny is crucially needed to inform
possible corrections of the patent system as we weigh our theories of
the nature and purpose of patents against the realities of application
processing.217 Bureaucrats matter.

Doors to Regulatory Capture? Evidence from Patent Examiners 3, 19
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24638, 2018) (finding
that examiners grant more patents to firms that later hire them).
217. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 14, at 77.
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